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Abstract Interdependent-choice equilibrium is defined as an exten-
sion of correlated equilibrium in which the mediator is able to choose
the timing of her signals, and observe the actions taken by the players.
The set of interdependent-choice equilibria is a nonempty, closed and
convex polytope. It characterizes all the outcomes that can be imple-
mented in single shot interactions without repetition, side payments,
binding contracts or any other form of delegation.
Keywords Interdependent choices · Sequential implementation · Me-
diation · Solution concepts · Robust predictions
JEL classification C72 · D86
When agents make choices independently, standard notions of rationality postulate
that each agent forms a belief about his opponent’s behavior, and then chooses a myopic
best response. The story is quite difference once the choices of some agents may depend
on the choices of others. In such settings, it is not sufficient for agents to consider the
material consequences of their choices taking the behavior of their opponents as given.
Each agent must also consider the way that his opponents will react depending on his
own choice. A particularly important form of reaction or counterfactual reasoning is
reciprocity: an agent may believe that others will be god to him if and only if he is
good to them.
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acknowledge the comments and suggestions from Kalyan Chaterjee, Nail Kashaev, Vijay Krishna,
Bulat Gafarov and Bruno Sultanum, as well as Wiroy Shin and the attendants of the 1st Prospects
in Economic Research Conference at Penn State, the 2013 Midwest Economic Theory Meeting at
Michigan State University, the 24th International Game Theory Conference at Stonny Brook, and the
2013 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society at National University Singapore. All remaining errors
are my own.
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Choice interdependence is relevant in moral hazard environments with no Pareto
efficient Nash equilibria. With complete information, moral hazard is completely elim-
inated when agents can enforce complete contracts (Coase theorem), or when they
interact repeatedly and are patient enough (folk theorems). This is possible because
written contracts or publicly observed histories serve as coordination devices allowing
for interdependence. The purpose of this paper is to abstract the notion of choice inter-
dependence from such settings, and investigate the extent to which its power remains
in settings without: commitment, repetition, or side payments.1 In short, I find that a
lot but not all of it remains.
In order to answer this question, I follow the methodology from Forges (1986). First,
I introduce a class of canonical mechanisms called mediated games, in which a non-
strategic mediator manages the play through private recommendations. Interdependent-
choice equilibrium (ICE) is defined as the set of distributions that can result from Nash
incentive compatible mediated games. The main result is that the class of mediated
games is complete, in that every equilibrium outcome of any mechanism consistent with
the assumptions of no commitment, no repetition and no side payments, is an ICE.
Related literatures take as given either the sequential structure of choices, the infor-
mation structure, or both.2 In contrast, I allow the mediator to determine the timing
of signals and the order in which actions are taken,3 to observe the actions taken by
the players, and to choose signals conditional on her observation. These enables some
reciprocal strategies. If a player deviates from the intended plan, and he is not the
last player to move, the mediator can recommend the remaining players to punish him.
As a result the set of implementable outcomes can be considerably large. However, no
“folk theorem” is obtained because it is only possible to generate incentives for early
movers according to the chosen order.
ICE is defined in terms of Nash incentive constraints, as if the players could com-
mit to punish deviations off the equilibrium path. In order to comply with the no-
commitment requirement, it is thus important to take into account the problem of per-
fection. Sections 3 and 4 provide sufficient conditions for sequential implementation, as
well as complete characterizations of sequential implementation in 2× 2 environments,
and a new notion of quasi-sequential implementation in arbitrary environments. The
conditions are tractable and have a relatively small impact. For example, if there are no
strictly dominated actions, every ICE can be implemented as a sequential equilibrium
of a mediated game.
1Different papers ask related questions under different assumptions, usually allowing for different
forms of commitment, repetition or transfers, or departing from mainstream notions of rationality.
Relevant works are discussed in section 2.3.
2 For example, papers on communication (Aumann, 1987, Myerson, 1986, Forges, 1986), espionage
games (Solan and Yariv, 2004), and endogenous leadership (Van Damme and Hurkens, 1999).
3 Allowing the mediator to control the timing of choices might be a strong assumption. This lax
approach helps to capture full potential of choice interdependence. The model can be adapted to
settings in which the mediator can only choose the timing of her signals, see §5.1.a.
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1. Motivating example: a prisoner’s dilemma
Nishihara (1997, 1999) provides an illustrative example showing that cooperation in
a prisoner’s dilemma can sometimes be implemented without contracts,side payments
or repetition. The salient features of Nishihara’s model are that players are uncertain
about the order of choices, and the information structure allows players to recognize
and react to past defections. This section describes a form to generate Nishinara’s
information structure using a typical mediation mechanism.
Suppose that two suspects of a crime are arrested. The DA has enough evidence to
convict them of a misdemeanor but requires a written confession to convict them for the
alleged crime. The DA then offers each prisoner a sentence reduction in exchange for
a confession. Each of the prisoners has to choose whether to behave cooperatively (C)
by remaining silent or to defect (D) by confessing. Their preferences are summarized
by the payoff matrix in Figure 1, where B < b < g < G.
C D
C g , g B , G
D G , B b , b
Figure 1 Payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma
In the story told, there is no reason to assume that players will have to make a
decision at exactly the same time. Also, even if the prisoners cannot directly communi-
cate with each other, it is by no means clear that their choices need to be independent.
Different forms of interdependence could either arise naturally or be artificially con-
structed. Even so, implementing cooperation remains a non-trivial task because the
decision to confess cannot be delegated, and the legal obligation to confess prevents the
enforcement of contracts that would bind them to remain silent. However, they could
hire a lawyer who would schedule and be present in all the negotiations with the DA
and instruct him as follows:
“You must randomize uniformly the order of our meetings. If the DA offers
us a (prisoner’s dilemma) deal you must always recommend that we do not
confess, unless one of us has already confessed, in which case you must
recommend that we do confess. Other than those recommendations, you
must not provide us with any additional information.”
The resulting situation can be described by the extensive form game in Figure 2. In
the event that the first prisoner to move confesses, the second prisoner will be informed
of this choice before making his own. If the first player decides to cooperate, the second
prisoner will remain uninformed about which of the two following events is true: (i) the
event in which he is the first prisoner to receive the offer, and (ii) the event in which
he is the second one and his accomplice remained silent.
The strategies represented with arrows support full cooperation and constitute an
equilibrium as long as G − g ≤ g − b. That is, as long as the benefit that a player
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Figure 2 A sequential mechanism for the prisoner’s dilemma
can obtain from unilaterally deviating from (C,C) is less or equal to the inefficiency
of both players confessing. This is possible because, along the equilibrium path, each
prisoner assigns sufficient probability to the event in which: (i) if he cooperates, then
his accomplice will remain uninformed and will also cooperate; and (ii) if he confesses,
then his accomplice will learn of his defection and will punish him by also confessing.
2. Interdependent-choice equilibrium and Nash implementation
The environment is described by a tuple E = (I, A, u). It represents a situation in
which players i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , n} are to make decisions. For exposition purposes I
assume n = 2, see §5.1.b for hte general case. Each player i is to choose and perform
one and only one action from a finite set Ai = {ai, a
′
i, . . .}. i’s preferences over action
profiles are represented by ui : A→ R.
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Such description is only a partial characterization of the environment. It says noth-
ing about the order in which choices will be made, nor about the information that each
player will have at the moment of making his choice. In particular, it is not assumed
that choices are independent or simultaneous.
2.1. Interdependent-choice equilibrium
Interdependent-choice equilibrium (ICE) is defined in terms of a simple class of
extensive form games in which a non-strategic mediator manages the players through
private recommendations. A (sequentially) mediated mechanism is a tuple (α, θ, B).
α ∈ ∆(A) is a distribution over action profiles to be implemented. θ : A → ∆(I)
4I employ the notation −i for i’s opponent, a ∈ A = ×iAi for action profiles, α ∈ ∆(A) for
joint distributions, αi ∈ ∆(Ai) for marginal distributions, and α( · |ai) ∈ ∆(A−i) for conditional
distributions.
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specifies a distribution over the order in which players will move, conditional on the
action profile to be implemented. θ(i|a) is the probability that player i will be the first
player to move, conditional on a being chosen. B = ×iBi specifies actions that can
be recommended as additional credible threats. The effective set of credible threats
B∗i = Bi ∪ suppαi also includes the actions played along the equilibrium path.
The tuple (α, θ, B) characterizes the extensive form game described as follows. The
game begins with the mediator privately choosing the action profile a∗ that she wants
to implement (according to α), and the player i∗ to move first (according to θ( · |a∗)).
She then “visits” each of the players one by one, visiting i∗ first and −i∗ second. When
visiting each player i, the mediator recommends an action ari , and observes the action
actually taken api . At the moment of making their choices, the players do not possess
any information other than the recommendation they receive. The mediator always
recommends the intended action to the first player, i.e. ari∗ = a
∗
i∗ . She recommends the
intended action to the second player if the first player complied, and one of the worst
available punishments in B∗−i∗ otherwise, i.e.:
ar−i∗ = a
∗
−i∗ if a
p
i∗ = a
∗
i∗
ar−i∗ ∈ argmin
a
−i∗∈B
∗
−i∗
ui∗
(
api∗ , a−i∗
)
if api∗ 6= a
∗
i∗
A mediated mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if following the mediator’s
recommendations constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Since only Nash incentive compati-
bility is required, there are no incentive constraints for the punishments (which occur
off the equilibrium path). Incentive compatibility is thus characterized by requiring
that for every player i ∈ I and every pair of actions ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai:
∑
a−i∈A−i
α(ai, a−i)
(
ui(ai, a−i)−
(
1− θ(i|a)
)
ui(a
′
i, a−i)− θ(i|a)wi(a
′
i|B
∗
−i)
)
≥ 0 (1)
where wi(a
′
i|B
∗
−i) ≡ min
a−i∈B∗
−i
ui(a
′
i, a−i).
Definition 1 A distribution over action profiles α ∈ ∆(A) is an interdependent-choice
equilibrium with respect to a set of credible threats B, if and only if there exists some
conditional ordering distribution θ such that (α, θ, B) is incentive compatible.
Let ICE(B) denote the set of ICE with respect to B. When B = A, I omit the
reference to the set of credible threats, and simply say that α ∈ ICE is an ICE.
The inequalities defining ICE resemble those which define other solution concepts
involving choice interdependence. Setting θ(i|a) = δ ∈ (0, 1) and imposing additional
restrictions on w, results in the recursive characterization of SPNE of repeated games
due to Abreu et al. (1990). If θ(i|a) = 0, then players cannot punish deviations, and
the definition reduces to correlated equilibria. In the opposite extreme, if θ(i|a) = 1,
then players are always able to punish deviations, which results in interim individual
rationality. Of course, it cannot be the case that θ(i|a) = 1 for every i, because θ( · |a)
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is a probability measure. This is the reason why ICE does not result in a folk theorem:
it is only possible to generate incentives for the first player to move, and it cannot be
the case that both players move before their opponent.
Individually rational
Correlated
Nash hull
ICE
u1
u2
1
4
5
1 4 5(S,S)
(S,W)
(W,S)
(W,W)
Figure 3 Equilibrium payoffs for example 1
From the previous analysis, it follows that the inequalities defining ICE are tighter
than those of individual rationality, and weaker than those of correlated equilibrium.
Hence the set of ICE is always contained in the set of individually rational outcomes,
and contains the set of correlated equilibria (and is thus nonempty). The following
example adapted from Aumann (1987) shows that the containments can be strict.
Example 1 Two partners decide whether to work (W) or shirk (S) in a joint-venture,
their payoffs are depicted in Figure 3. The figure also shows the sets of payoffs corre-
sponding to individual rationality, Nash equilibrium with public randomization, corre-
lated equilibrium, and ICE. In this example, all the Pareto efficient outcomes correspond
to ICE, and all but one ICE are sequential equilibria of the mediated game.
(W,W) is not a Nash equilibrium because, whenever an agent is working, his oppo-
nent prefers to shirk. It is an ICE because, a player who considers shirking knows that
with some probability, his opponent will learn of this defection and react by also shirk-
ing. The payoff vector (1, 1) cannot be attained as an ICE, because it requires players to
shirk with high probability. Since each player always prefers that his opponent works,
this leaves too little room to punish deviations.
The existence statement makes definition 1 appear complicated. Alternatively, let
Γ(B) be the set of joint distributions γ ∈ ∆(A× I) satisfying the inequalities:
∑
a−i∈A−i
[
γ(a)u(a)− γ(a, i)w(a′i, B
∗
−i)− γ(a,−i)u(a
′
i, a−i)
]
≥ 0 (2)
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for all i ∈ I and ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai. ICE(B) is the projection of Γ(B) over ∆(A). Hence, when
the corresponding support of all equilibria is guaranteed to be a subset of B (e.g. when
B = A), the set of ICE with respect to B is a simple object characterized by a finite
set of affine inequalities. A difficulty may arise otherwise, because w may depend on
on B∗, which in turn depends on γ. Hence the incentive constraints may no longer be
affine or even continuous.
2.2. Nash implementation
The purpose of the current work is to characterize the outcomes that can be im-
plemented as equilibria without any form of repetition, monetary transfers or binding
agreements from the part of the players. In order to formalize the meaning of implemen-
tation, one needs to define the largest class of mechanisms which are consistent with
the partial characterization of the environment, and with such restrictions. The tech-
nical definition is relegated to appendix A. The essential conditions can be informally
described as follows.
Definition 2 An extensive form mechanism (EFM) is any extensive form such that:
(i) Terminal nodes can be identified with action profiles from the environment.
(ii) Along every possible path of play, each player makes some move which can be
interpreted as choosing one of his actions from the environment.
(iii) At the moment of choosing his action, each player could have chosen any other
action from his original action space.
Condition (ii) rules out delegation and binding agreements. The ruling out of del-
egation is straightforward: each player has to freely choose which action to perform at
some point of the game. The ruling out of binding agreements is a little more subtle.
To understand what the requirement encompasses it is useful to consider the literature
on preplay negotiations dating back to Kalai (1981). Kalai allows players publicly an-
nounce their intentions, and these announcements may become binding depending on
the announcements of others. Announcing an action is not exactly the same as per-
forming it, because the action is only executed if the announcement becomes binding.
Otherwise the choice can be reverted and the player may choose a different action. In
contrast, I require that some moves of the game should corresponds to the irreversible
act of performing an action from the environment.
Condition (iii) rules out partial-commitment. For example, consider a variation
of the prisoners dilemma in which each prisoner chooses between confessing to a big
crime, confessing to a minor crime or not confessing at all. I rule out the possibility
that at some point of the game a player makes a move that will force him to confess,
and later on decides which crime to confess. Every action from the environment has to
be available at the moment of making a decisive move.
Condition (i) implies that players preferences must be determined by the chosen
action profile, and cannot depend on side payments or future events. This rules out
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monetary transfers and repetition. Furthermore, it enables to identify outcomes of
the mechanism with outcomes of the environment. Therefore, once can say that a
strategy profile for an EFM induces a distribution over action profiles. This results in
the following natural definition of implementation.
Definition 3 A distribution over action profiles is (Nash, sequentially, . . . ) imple-
mentable if and only if it can be induced by a (Nash, sequential, . . . ) equilibrium of an
extensive form mechanism.
Mediated games do not involve any form of repetition, monetary transfers or binding
agreements from the part of the players. The role of the mediator is simply to generate
an information structure that allows for responsive strategies. Hence, the set of ICE
describes a set of outcomes that can be Nash implemented under these restrictions. A
natural question is whether there are other implementable distributions, and the answer
is no.
Theorem 1 A distribution over action profiles is Nash implementable if and only if it
is an interdependent-choice equilibrium.
The proof follows the general approach introduced by Forges (1986). The sufficiency
is standard because mediated games are EFMs. For necessity, given an EFM and an
equilibrium, it is possible to construct a mediated game that replicates the strategic
features, but gives players the minimal amount of information needed to follow the
plan of action. By reducing their information, players’ ability to deviate profitably also
decreases.
2.3. Comparison with related literature
Choice interdependence is a common theme across a variety of otherwise distant
literatures. Besides the well established literatures on repeated games and games with
contracts, different literatures allow for different forms of implicit repetition, commit-
ment or transfers. The literature on counterfactual variations can be thought of as
a reduced representation of repeated games (Kalai and Stanford, 1985). Commitment
can be traced back to Moulin and Vial (1978) and Kalai (1981), which allow players
to delegate choices to a mediator, or make preplay binding announcements. With un-
restricted commitment, one obtains folk theorems (Kalai et al., 2010). Recent relevant
works in this area include Bade et al. (2009), Renou (2009), Forgó (2010). For monetary
transfers see Jackson and Wilkie (2005).
Other literatures across different fields allow for counterfactual reasoning without
being too explicit about the source of interdependence. Seminal examples include
Rapoport (1965) and Howard (1971), see also Hofstadter (1996) and Brams (1993).
More recently, Halpern and Rong (2010) and Halpern and Pass (2012), analize equilib-
rium and rationaliability with counterfactual beliefs. Once again, folk theorems hold
if no further restrictions are imposed. These literatures have faced some criticism as
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some of the beliefs may not be consistent with free will, (Gibbard and Harper, 1980,
Lewis, 1979).
The present work serves as a bridge between these literatures, asking which couter-
factual beliefs can arise from different sequential and informational structures, but
without repetition or commitment. These restrictions are sufficient to rule out a folk
theorem. Other works along these lines typically depart from classical notions of choice
and rationality. For instance, Eisert et al. (1999) shows that cooperation is possible
in a prisoners dilemma, when players can condition their choices on certain quantum
randomization devices with entangled states.
Tennenholtz (2004)’s program equilibrium generates choice interedependence for
games between computer programms by allowing them to read each other’s code before
making a decision. Similarly, Levine and Pesendorfer (2007)’s self-referential equilib-
rium allows player’s to receive a signal about their opponent’s intentions before making
their own choice. Kamada and Kandori (2009, 2012) and Calcagno et al. (2012)’s re-
vision games are based on a similar logic, but are more explicit about the information
structure. I rule out such signals this kind of signals as they represent a from of com-
mitment: from the moment of deciding which action to play, to the moment of actually
performing it. ICE can arise in settings where choices are instantaneous and players
can hide their intentions.
3. Credible threats and the problem of perfection
A problem remains because, while ICE does not involve any form of explicit com-
mitment from part of the players, Nash incentive compatibility does not impose any
restrictions off the equilibrium path. ICE is defined as if players where committed to
punish deviations off the equilibrium path, regardless of whether doing so would be op-
timal if the circumstance were to arise. This section addresses this issue by investigating
which ICE can be implemented as sequential equilibria of EFM. Section §3.1 provides
tractable sufficient conditions for arbitrary environments, and section §3.2 provides a
generic characterization for 2× 2 environments.
3.1. A sufficient condition for sequential implementation
The sufficient condition for sequential implementation provided here is based on
three observations. First, suppose that α is a interdependent-choice equilibrium with
respect to B = ∅. In the corresponding mediated game, all the actions which are
recommended as punishments are also recommended along the equilibrium path. This
implies that every information set is reached with positive probability, and following
the mediator recommendations thus constitutes a sequential equilibrium.
Secondly, given two extensive form mechanisms, one can construct a new mechanism
in which nature randomizes between them. If the outcome of the randomization public,
then incentives remain unchanged. Let AS = ×i∈I A
S
i denote the set of profiles of actions
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which are played with positive probability in some sequentially implementable distri-
bution. The second observation implies that there exists a sequentially implementable
distribution αS such that αSi (ai) > 0 for every ia ∈ A
S
i . Also, together with the first
observation, it implies that every α ∈ ICE(AS) can be approximated by sequentially
implementable distributions.
Finally, let AR be the set of first-order rationalizable action profiles. Sequential
equilibrium does not impose any restrictions on the relative likelihood of different de-
viations. Hence, any action in AR can be used as a credible threat. For instance, if a1
is a best response to a2, then one can construct a mediated game in which, whenever 1
is asked to play a1, he will believe that it is because 2 deviated by choosing a2.
The preceding discussion suggests that every α ∈ ICE(AR ∪ AS) is sequentially
implementable. However, there is no obvious way of finding AS and, unless AS ⊆ AR,
computing ICE(AR) can be difficult since the incentive constraints could be neither
linear nor continuous. Instead, I propose a recursive procedure much in the spirit of
the APS algorithm (Abreu et al., 1990), to find a set A∞ ⊆ AS with the property
that every ICE equilibrium with respect to A∞ is sequentially implementable. Let
A = {×i∈IA
′
i | A
′
i ⊆ Ai} and define T : A → A by:
T(A′) = ×
i∈I
{
ai ∈ Ai
∣∣∣ ∃α ∈ ICE(A′ ∪ AR) such that αi(ai) > 0}
In words, T(A′) includes only those actions played with positive probability in some
ICE with respect to A′ ∪ AR. Now define the sequence {An}n∈N by A
1 = A and
An+1 = T(An).
Proposition 2 An is a decreasing sequence converging in finite time to a nonempty
limit A∞, and this limit satisfies A∞ = T(A∞) and A′ ⊆ A∞ whenever A′ ⊆ T(A′).
ICE(A∞ ∪ AR) is convex and A∞ = T(A∞). Hence there exists an ICE αICE ∈
ICE(A∞) with support αICE. As before, since all the information sets are reached
with positive probability in corresponding mediated game, αICE is sequentially imple-
mentable. Therefore A∞ ⊆ AS and the following theorem follows from the previous
discussion.5
Theorem 3 If α is an interdependent-choice equilibrium with respect to A∞∪AR, then
it is sequentially implementable.
The fact that the iterative procedure is monotone implies that the conditions from
theorem 3 are computationally tractable. In each stage of the process, if α ∈ ICE(An∪
AR) then supp(α) ⊆ An. Hence, the set of effective threats coincides with the set of
additional threats, and ICE(An∪AR) is characterized by a finite set of affine inequalities.
5 For the theorem to hold, there must be at least three players, or it must be feasible for Nature
to make null choices. Otherwise, instead α being sequentially implementable, one can only guarantee
that for every ε > 0, there exists a sequentially implementable distribution α′ such that ‖α− α′‖ < ε.
The reason for this is made apparent in the last step of the proof.
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With this in mind, finding A∞ is much computationally easier than the APS algorithm.
First, only pure actions are eliminated at each iteration, which means that the elements
of the sequence can be described with finite information. Also, T(An) is defined by a
decreasing number of affine inequalities. Finally, convergence is achieved in finitely
many iterations and –since ICE is a permissive solution concept– the required number
of iterations should be small (if positive at all).
The conditions are also very permissive. Since both the sequential structure and
the off-path beliefs are design variables, restricting attention to sequential equilibria
has a relatively small impact. For example, in environments with no strict dominance,
A∞ ∪ AR = AR = A, and thus Nash and sequential implementability coincide. Hence
the following corollary.
Corollary 4 When there are no strictly dominated actions, a distribution is sequen-
tially implementable if and only if it is an interdependent-choice equilibrium.
L C D R
T 3 , 0 0 , k 0 , 0 0 , 3
C k , 0 6 , 6 2 , 9 k , 0
D 0 , 0 9 , 2 5 , 5 0 , 0
B 0 , 3 0 , k 0 , 0 3 , 0
Figure 4 Payoff matrix for examples 2 and 3.
Example 2 Consider the environment described by the payoff matrix in Figure 4 with
k = 2. The central part of the matrix corresponds to a prisoner’s dilemma in which
cooperation is not an ICE. Cooperation can be implemented using T and R as pun-
ishments. Furthermore, following recommendations is a sequential equilibrium as long
as the players consider B and L to be the most likely deviations. However, T and
R cannot be played with positive probability in any ICE. Hence A∞ = {(D,D)} 6=
{D,C} × {D,C} = AS, and (C,C) is sequentially implementable despite the fact that
it is not an ICE with respect to AS.
It is possible to construct more complicated examples with admit distributions that
can only be sequentially implemented using punishments outside of AS ∪AR. This im-
plies that the conditions from Theorem 3 are not sufficient. I have not being able to find
a tractable characterization of the set of sequentially implementable outcomes in general
environments. Instead, the remainder of this section focuses on 2 × 2 environments,
and the following section analizes a notion of quasi-sequential implementation.
3.2. C-rationalizability and 2 by 2 environments
A natural restriction on the set of credible threats is that every punishment should
be rationalizable, i.e. it should be a best response to some rational belief of the player
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performing it. The relevant notion of rationalizability must take into account choice-
interdependence.6
At the moment of choosing his action, each player’s belief about his opponent behav-
ior may depend on his own choice. Players thus maximize expected utility with respect
to counterfactual beliefs λi : Ai → ∆(A−i), where λi(a−i|ai) ≡ [λi(ai)](a−i) represents
i’s assessed likelihood that his opponent will choose to play a−i if he plays ai. Expected
utility is denote by Ui(ai, λi) =
∑
a−i∈A−i ui(ai, a−i) · λi(a−i|ai). Given an action space
A′ ∈ A , Λi(A
′) denotes the set of counterfactual beliefs such that λi(A−i|ai) = 1 for
every ai ∈ Ai.
Definition 4 [Counterfactual rationalizability]
◦ a∗i ∈ Ai is C-rationalizable with respect to A
′ ∈ A , if and only if there exists
some λi ∈ Λi(A
′) such that a∗i ∈ argmaxai∈Ai Ui(ai, λi).
◦ A′ ∈ A is self-C-rationalizable if and only if every action profile in A′ consists
of actions that are C-rationalizable with respect to A′.
◦ The set of C-rationalizable actions ACR is the largest self-C-rationalizable set.
Let CRi(A
′) denote the set of i’s actions that are C-rationalzable with respect to
A′. ACR is guaranteed to exist because CR( · ) is ⊆-monotone. Consequently, the union
of all self C-rationalizable sets is also self C-rationalizable. It is nonempty because it
always contains the set of rationalizable action profiles. ACR can be found in a tractable
way using the notion of absolute dominance, which is analogous to the standard notion
of strict dominance.
Definition 5 Given two actions ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai, ai absolutely dominates a
′
i with respect to
A′ ∈ A if and only if mina−i∈A′
−i
ui(ai, a−i) > maxa−i∈A′
−i
ui(a
′
i, a−i).
In other words, ai absolutely dominates a
′
i, if and only if the best possible payoff
from playing a′i is strictly worse than the worst possible payoff from playing ai. Absolute
dominance is much simpler than strict dominance in computational terms because a
player can conjecture different reactions for each alternative action, and hence mixed
actions need not be considered. The following proposition ensures that CR(A′) can
be obtained by eliminating absolutely dominated actions, and ACR can be found by
repeating this process iteratively.
Proposition 5 An action is C-rationalizable with respect to A′ if and only if it is not
absolutely dominated in A′, and the iterated removal of all absolutely dominated actions
is order independent and converges in finite time to ACR.
6This notion was developed independently by Halpern and Pass (2012), who additionally show
that, when counterfactual beliefs are allowed, it is equivalent to rationality and common certainty of
rationality.
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In 2× 2 environments without repeated payoffs there are two possibilities. If there
are no absolutely dominated actions, then there is an ICE with full support and hence
A∞ = A. Otherwise, there is a unique ICE with respect to A∞; namely, a player
chooses his unique dominant action and his opponent chooses the unique best response
to it. In view of Theorem 3, this results in the following characterization of sequential
implementation for 2× 2 environments without repeated payoffs.
Proposition 6 In generic 2 × 2 environments, a distribution is sequentially imple-
mentable if and only if it is a interdependent-choice equilibrium with respect to the set
of self-C-rationalizable action profiles.
4. Quasi-sequential implementation
This section defines a form of quasi-seqeuntial equilibrium (QSE), and provides suf-
ficient and necessary conditions for quasi-sequential (QS) implementation. Sequential
equilibria are QSE, and thus these conditions are also necessary for sequential imple-
mentation. The focus on QSE is partially motivated by the fact that it is the finer
refinement for which I can provide a complete characterization. However, QSE might
be an interesting solution concept in its own right, see section 5.1.d.
4.1. Quasi-sequential equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium is defined in terms of sequential rationality and belief con-
sistency. Sequential rationality requires choices to be optimal at the interim stage for
every information set in the game. Off the equilibrium path, belief consistency requires
players to update their beliefs in accordance with some prior assessment of the relative
likelihoods of different trembles or mistakes. Furthermore, it requires that these prior
assessments should be common to all players. QSE imposes sequential rationality and
requires beliefs to be consistent with trembles, but allows players to disagree about
which deviations are more likely.
For two player environments, it is useful to allow Nature to assign zero probability
to some of its available moves. This is because, when faced with a null event, a player
can believe that it was Nature who made a mistake instead of necessarily believing that
an opponent deviated from the equilibrium.7 In order to define consistent beliefs, it is
necessary to introduce new notation to denote players’ beliefs about Nature’s choices,
other than σ∗0. Let Σ0 and Σ
+
0 denote the sets of mixed strategies and strictly mixed
strategies for Nature.
7 It is often assumed that Nature assigns positive probability to all of its available moves, but I
am unaware of any good arguments to maintain this assumption. Consider for instance the following
quote from Kreps and Wilson (1982): “To keep matters simple, we henceforth assume that the players
initial assessments [on Nature’s choices] are strictly positive”, page 868. For further discussion see
section §5.1.c.
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A conditional belief system for i in an extensive form game G, is a function ψi
mapping i’s information sets to distributions over nodes. ψi(y|H) is the probability
that i assigns in information set H to being in node y.8 Let Ψi denote the set of i’s
conditional belief systems. An assessment is a tuple (ψ, σ) ∈ Ψ×Σ that specifies both
players interim and prior beliefs (or strategies). An extended assessment is a tuple
(ψ, σ, σ0) ∈ Ψ × Σ × Σ0 that also specifies prior beliefs on Nature’s choices. Given an
assessment (ψ, σ), an information set H and an available move m, Vi(m|H) denotes
i’s expected payoff from choosing m at H . The expectation is taken given his interim
beliefs ψi(H) regarding the current state of the game, and assuming that future choices
will be made according to σ.
Definition 6 [Quasi-sequential equilibrium] An assessment (ψ∗, σ∗) ∈ Ψ× Σ is:
◦ Weakly consistent if and only if for every player there exists a sequence of strictly
mixed extended assessments (ψn, σn, σn0 ) satisfying Bayes’ rule and converging
to (ψ∗, σ∗, σ∗0).
◦ Sequentially rational if and only if Vi(s(H)|H) ≥ Vi(m|H) for every player i,
information set H ∈ Hi and available move m ∈ M(H), and every strategy
si ∈ Si such that σ
∗
i (si) > 0.
◦ A quasi-sequential equilibrium (QSE) if it is both weakly consistent and sequen-
tially rational.
Sequential rationality requires that the choices that occur off the equilibrium path
should be optimal. This implies that players must always believe that the future choices
of their opponents will be rational, and this fact is common knowledge. However, off
the equilibrium path, QSE imposes no restrictions on beliefs about past choices, nor
agreement of beliefs across different players. In that sense, the difference between QSE
and Nash equilibrium can be thought of as a form of future-looking rationalizability off
the equilibrium path.9
The only difference between QSE and sequential equilibrium, is that the former
imposes a stronger notion of consistency. Namely, the same sequence of strictly mixed
assessments should work for all players. Loosely speaking, sequential equilibrium re-
quires choices and beliefs to be in equilibrium, not only along the equilibrium path, but
also in every ‘subgame’. In contrast, QSE requires equilibrium along the equilibrium
path, but only imposes a form of rationalizability in null ‘subgames’.
4.2. Credible threats for quasi-sequential implementation
The preceding discussion suggests two kind of actions which can always be enforced
as credible punishments for QS implementation. C-rationalizable punishments are ad-
missible because QSE implementation does not require agreement off the equilibrium
path. Hence, the player performing the punishment may very well have counterfactual
8See §A.1 for the notation regarding extensive form games
9This idea closely resembles the notion of common belief in future rationality from Perea (2013).
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beliefs which rationalize it. Additionally, since QSE only imposes belief of rationality
for future choices, beliefs about past can be chosen freely. Best responses to arbitrary
degenerate conjectures are thus also admissible. These two ideas are embodied in the
notion of future-looking counterfactual rationalizablity.
Definition 7 [Future-looking counterfactual rationalizability]
◦ a∗i ∈ Ai is FC-rationalizable with respect to A
′ ∈ A if and only if there exists
a belief λ0i ∈ ∆(A−i), a counterfactual belief λ
1
i ∈ Λ(A
′), and some µ ∈ [0, 1]
such that a∗i maximizes expected utility with respect to the counterfactual belief
λi = µλ
0
i +(1−µ)λ
1
i ∈ Λi(A). Let FCRi(A
′) denote the set of profiles consisting
of FC-rationalzable actions with respect to A′.
◦ A′ ∈ A is self-FC-rationalizable if and only if A′ ⊆ FCR(A′).
◦ The set of FC-rationalizable action profiles AFCR ∈ A is the largest self-FC-
rationalizable set.
As before, AFCR is guaranteed to exist because FCR( · ) is ⊆-monotone, and thus the
union of all self-FC-rationalizable sets is self-FC-rationalizable. Also, it is non-empty
because it always contains the set of C-rationalizable action profiles.
Intuitively, one can think of λ0i as the arbitrary beliefs (degenerate conjectures)
over past deviations, and think of λ1i as the conjectures about future FC-rationalizable
choices. With this interpretation, an action ai is FC-rationalizable with respect to an
action space A′ if it is a best response to some conjecture λi that assigns full probability
to actions in A′−i, only for choices that occur in the future. λi can assign positive prob-
ability to any action, provided that this probability is independent from i’s choice. The
set of FC-rationalizable actions is exactly the set of credible threats that characterizes
QS implementation.
Theorem 7 A distribution over action profiles is quasi-sequentially implementable if
and only if it is an interdependent-choice equilibrium with respect to the set of self-FC-
rationalizable action profiles.
There are two interesting corollaries of this result. First, since sequential imple-
mentability implies QS implementability, Theorem 7 can be interpreted as a necessary
condition for sequential implementation in arbitrary environments.
Corollary 8 Every sequentially implementable distribution is an interdependent-choice
equilibrium with respect to AFCR.
Second, since C-rationalziable actions are FC-rationalizable, in games with no abso-
lute dominance a distribution is QS implementable if and only if it is an interdependent-
choice equilibrium. This means that requiring QSE instead of Nash equilibrium has a
small impact, because most games of interest have no absolutely dominated actions.
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Corollary 9 When there are no absolutely dominated actions, a distribution is quasi-
sequentially implementable if and only if it is an interdependent-choice equilibrium.
Example 3 Consider the environment described by the payoff matrix in Figure 4, but
now suppose that k = 5. Let Θi be the event that player i is the first player to move.
Now, for player 1 to choose T he must assign probability at least 2/3 to Θ1 and and
player 2 choosing L. Similarly, for player 2 to choose L he must assign probability at
least 2/3 to Θ2 and and player 1 choosing B. Moreover, for player 1 to choose B he must
assign probability at least 2/3 to Θ1 and and player 2 choosing R. Finally, for player 2
to choose R he must assign probability at least 2/3 to Θ2 and and player 1 choosing T.
Hence T and L can only be played if the players disagree about the order of play in a
way that is not consistent with sequential implementation. Therefore T and L cannot
be used as credible threats for sequential implementation, and the only sequentially
implementable outcome is (D,D). However, since there is no absolute dominance, T
and L are credible threats for QS implementation, and thus (C,C) is QS implementable.
This section concludes with a characterization of the operator FCR. Loosely speak-
ing, the following proposition shows that it is equivalent to the elimination of strictly
dominated actions in an auxiliary game.
Proposition 10 An action ai ∈ Ai is FC-rationalizable with respect to an action sub-
space A′ ∈ A if and only if there is no αi ∈ ∆(Ai) such that:
(i) max
{
ui(ai, a−i)
∣∣∣ a−i ∈ A′−i} < min {Ui(αi, a−i) ∣∣∣ a−i ∈ A′−i}
(ii) ui(ai, a−i) < Ui(αi, a−i) for all a−i ∈ A−i\A
′
−i
5. Summary and discussion
The current paper analyzes choice-interdependence as a mechanism to generate in-
centives in moral hazard environments. It introduces a class of mediated games in which
a mediator manages the game through private recommendations. Two salient aspects
of the model are that the recommendations are sequential and occur during the actual
play of the game, and that they can depend on previous choices. This enables reciprocal
strategies that, for instance, may allow for cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. ICE
are defined as Nash equilibria of mediated games. The set of ICE admits a canonical
characterization consisting of a finite set of affine inequalities. Also, it characterizes all
the outcomes that can be implemented in equilibrium without repetition, commitment
or side payments.
The paper also provides conditions for implementation according to different equi-
librium refinements requiring sequential rationality. The conditions restrict the set of
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credible threats that the mediator can recommend as credible threats off the equilib-
rium path. Different sets of credible threats offer necessary and/or sufficient conditions
for different solution concepts. The implications are summarized in Figure 5.
ICE(A) ICE(AFCR) ICE(ACR) ICE(AS ∪AR) ICE(A∞ ∪AR)
Nash
implementation
Quasi-
seqeuntial
implementation
Sequential
implementation
2
×
2
gam
es
Figure 5 Summary of results
5.1. Discussion
5.1.a. Additional restrictions.– The formulation of ICE allows to capture additional
restrictions by adjusting the worst punishment functions w. For example, the assump-
tion that all deviations from equilibrium are publicly observed can be captured by
replacing the worst punishments function wi with w
′
i(a
′
i) = mina−iBR−i(a′i) ui(a
′
i, a−i),
where BR−i is −i’s best response correspondence. The resulting solution concept would
lie somewhere between correlated equilibrium and ICE.
Alternatively, instead of assuming that the mediator controls the order of choices,
suppose that she can control the order of her recommendations but players can choose
to act before or after they encounter her. In such cases, the mediator could not rec-
ommend action-specific punishments. A player who intended to deviate would make
his choice after the mediator has left, and thus the mediator could no longer ob-
serve the specific deviation. The set of implementable outcomes under these condi-
tions could be characterized by replacing wi with the constant minimax punishment
w′i(a
′
i) = minα−i∈∆(B∗
−i
)maxai∈Ai Ui(ai, α−i). Notice that this makes no difference when
each player has at most two actions.
5.1.b. Many players.– The definitions and results can be extended to n-player envi-
ronments, but the notation becomes cumbersome. For one thing, when the mediator
chooses an ordering of the players she is no longer choosing the player who moves
first but an entire enumeration n of I. Hence, θ must specify distributions over such
enumerations, and the incentive constraints become:
∑
a−i∈A−i
α(a)ui(a) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
∑
n
α(a)θ(n|a) ·min
{
ui
(
a′i, a
′
n+(i), an−(i)
) ∣∣∣∣ a′n+(i) ∈ B∗n+(i)
}
where n+(i) =
{
j ∈ I
∣∣∣ n(j) > n(i)} and n−(i) = {j ∈ I ∣∣∣ n(j) < n(i)} are the set of
players that move before and after i according to n. Of course, assuming of costless
and perfect monitoring becomes less appealing as the number of players increases.
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5.1.c. Mistakes by nature.– I allow players to attribute deviations from the equilib-
rium pathto unexpected moves by Nature (or a mediator). In equilibrium, when an
agent finds himself in the equilibrium path he may believe that is is because Nature
made a mistake and not because his opponent deviated. Since this is not a common
feature in other models, it deserves some justification.
Consider for instance the hypothetical situation of a loving marriage after the wife
finds unfamiliar lingerie mixed in the laundry. A plausible explanation is that the
husband deviated from the marital arrangement by involving in an extramarital rela-
tionship, and made the mistake of bringing home evidence of his deviation. However,
more often than not, a trusing wife is likely to ignore this story and instead recur to
intricate explanations involving unexpected chance events. Back to our abstract envi-
ronment, each player i knows that his opponents cannot gain from deviating, as long
as he sticks to his equilibrium strategy. Hence, he has no reason to be suspicious about
them, and attributing deviations to Nature may be reasonable.
A key element in this previous example is the trusting nature of the relationship.
This line of thought might find less favor in situations in which the agents have reasons
to be suspicious about each other. A extramarital affair is bound to be the favored
explanation by a suspicious wife who expects to be cheated. The sense in which allowing
for null chance moves is sensible might depend on the level of trust or suspicion among
the agents. In any case, Nature’s mistakes play a crucial role for Theorem 7, but not
for Theorem 3.
5.1.d. A rationale for QSE.– The focus on QSE is partially motivated by the fact that
it is the finer refinement for which I can provide a complete characterization. However,
there may be situations for which it is more appealing than sequential equilibrium. In
general, equilibrium is not a straightforward consequence of rational behavior. In order
to guarantee equilibrium one must assume mutual or common knowledge of choices or
conjectures (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995), which may be hard to justify off the
equilibrium path.
In this respect, focal point arguments may be questioned because of the complexity
of determining whether an equilibrium is sequential. Communication can be questioned
along similar lines, because planning for all possible contingencies or agreeing on their
likelihood may be too complex. Finally, precedence may provide a justification for
equilibrium, but repetition provides no experience about events which only happen off
the equilibrium path (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993). Hence there might be situations
in which (i) it makes sense to assume agreement exclusively along the equilibrium path;
and yet (ii) rationality and common certainty of rationality may also be defended in
every subgame.
5.1.e. Extensions.– The current paper leaves a number of open questions. The defini-
tion of mediated games assumes that choices are instantaneous and that players don’t
know the order in which choices are made. It is not clear whether this is possible
or what outcomes remain to be implementable once the temporal dimension is taken
into consideration. Other aspects yet to consider are incomplete information, imperfect
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or costly monitoring, and bargaining. Also, some degree of commitment is assumed
from part of the mediator. An interesting question is whether the mediator can be re-
placed by cheap-talk, or whether the required information structures can be generated
transparently (Izmalkov et al., 2005).
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A. Extensive form mechanisms
A.1. Extensive form games
Extensive form games are defined as in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), with some differ-
ences in notation. An extensive form game is a tuple G =
(
M,X, ι,H , σ∗0 , v
)
. M denotes a
set of moves. X ⊆ ∪t∈NM
t denotes a finite set of histories or nodes. ≤ denotes precedence
among nodes. M(x) = {m ∈M | (x,m) ∈ X} is the set of moves available at x. ι(x) ∈ I ∪{0}
is the agent moving at x, where 0 represents Nature (or a mediator). Z and Yi are the sets
of terminal nodes and i’s decision nodes respectively. Z(x) = {z ∈ Z | x ≤ z} is the set of
terminal nodes that can be reached after x. Hi partitions i’s decision nodes into information
sets and satisfies perfect recall. σ∗0 specifies the players’ common prior beliefs about Natures’
choices. Finally, vi : Z → R represents i’s preferences over terminal nodes. Notice that
attention is restricted to finite games with perfect recall.
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A pure strategy for player i is a function si : H → M , with ai(H) ∈ M(H) for every
H ∈ H . A mixed strategy for i is a distribution σi over his pure strategies, it is strictly
mixed if it has full support. Si, Σi and Σ
+
i denote the sets of i’s pure, mixed and strictly
mixed strategies respectively. Given that Nature chooses according to σ∗0 , a strategy profile
σ induces a distribution over nodes ζ( · |σ, σ∗0) ∈ ∆(X). ζ(x|σ, σ
∗
0) is the probability that the
game will reach x if players choose according to σ and Nature chooses according to σ∗0 . When
there is no ambiguity, I omit the reference to σ and σ∗0 and simply write ζ(x). Expected
payoffs V : Σ → R are defined in the obvious way. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy
profile σ∗ such that Vi(σ
∗) ≥ Vi(σ
′
i, σ
∗
−i) for every i and σ
′
i.
A.2. Extensive form mechanisms
This section formalizes the three requirements characterizing extensive form mechanisms
according to definition 2. The first requirement for an extensive form game to be an extensive
form mechanism is that it must preserve the outcome and preference structure of the envi-
ronment. That is, there must be a preference-preserving map from terminal nodes (outcomes
of the game) to action profiles (outcomes of the environment).
Definition 8 An outcome homomorphism is a function τ from terminal nodes onto action
profiles preserving preferences, i.e. such that v(z) = u(τ(z)) for every terminal node z. G is
outcome equivalent to E if it admits an outcome homomorphism.
The second and third conditions from definition 2 require that, each player should freely
choose his own action at some point in the game. Formalizing them requires a form of identify-
ing moves (choices in the game) with actions (choices in the environment). For the remainder
of this section, let G be outcome equivalent to E and fix an outcome homeomorphism τ .
For every player i and every corresponding decision node y, τ induces a representation rela-
tionship ≈y from the set of moves available at y in the game to the set of i’s actions in the
environment. A move m represents action ai at y, if and only if choosing m at y in the game
has the same effect in (payoff-relevant) outcomes as choosing ai in the environment. This idea
is formalized by the following definition.
Definition 9 Given a player i ∈ I and a decision node y ∈ Yi, a move m ∈M(y) represents
an action ai ∈ Ai at y if and only if:
(i) τi(z) = ai for every z ∈ Z(y,m)
(ii) There exist m′ ∈M(y) and z ∈ Z(y,m′) such that τi(z) 6= ai
The representation relationship is denoted by m≈yai, and M
ai(y) denotes the set of moves
that represent ai at y. A move is pivotal at y if and only if it represents some action.
The first requirement for m≈yai is that, if i chooses m at y, then the game will end at
a terminal node which is equivalent to ai according to τi. This is regardless of any previous
or future moves by either i or his opponents. The second requirement is that, after the game
reaches y, i could still choose a different move m′ after which the game remains open to the
possibility of ending at a terminal node that is not equivalent to ai.
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Definition 10 A decision node y ∈ Yi is pivotal for player i ∈ I if and only if M
ai(y) 6= ∅
for every ai ∈ Ai. Di ⊆ Y denotes the set of pivotal nodes for i.
In words, a decision node y is pivotal for player i if for every action ai ∈ Ai there exists a
pivotal move which represents it at y. Using this language, the second and third conditions
of definition 2 require that every player makes a pivotal move at a pivotal node along every
possible play of the game. A final technical condition is that a player should always know
when he is making a pivotal move representing some action.
Definition 11 (G, τ) satisfies full disclosure of consequences if and only if≈y = ≈y′ whenever
y and y′ belong to the same information set.
Finally, definitions 2 and 3 can be formally restated as follows:
Definition 2’ A extensive form mechanism is a tuple
(
G, τ
)
satisfying full disclosure of
consequences and such that for every terminal node z and every player i, there exists a
pivotal node y ∈ Di and a pivotal move m ∈M
τi(z) such that z ∈ Z(y,m).
Definition 3’ α ∈ ∆(A) is (Nash, sequentially, . . . ) implementable if and only if it there
exist a mechanism
(
G, τ
)
and a (Nash, sequential, . . . ) equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ such that for every
a ∈ A:
α(a) = ζ∗
(
τ−1(a)
)
=
∑
z∈Z
ζ(z, σ∗, σ∗0) · 1
(
τ(x) = a
)
B. Proofs
B.1. Nash implementation
Proof of Theorem 1. For sufficiency, a mediated game is an EFM and ICE result from NE
of mediated games. For necessity, consider a mechanism (G, τ), a NE σ∗ and let α be the
induced distribution. I will show that α ∈ ICE.
Fix any two of actions a∗i , a
′
i ∈ Ai with αi(a
∗
i ) > 0 and a
′
i 6= a
∗
i . For each information set
H ∈ Hi, let M
∗(H) be the set of moves that represent a∗i at H and are chosen with positive
probability. Also, let H ∗i be the set of information sets along the equilibrium path in which i
chooses a move representing a∗i with positive probability according to σ
∗. Finally, let ζ∗ be
distribution over nodes induced by σ∗. All the expectations and conditional distributions in
this proof are with respect to ζ∗.
Every H ∈ H ∗i must be pivotal, and thus admits a move m
′ ∈ Ma
′
i(H) representing a′i.
Since σ∗ is a NE, and H is along the equilibrium path, for each m∗ ∈M∗(H):
E
[
ui(a
∗
i , a−i)
∣∣H,m∗ ] ≥ E[ui(a′i, a−i) ∣∣H,m′ ] (3)
where H,m denotes the set of nodes H × {m} for m ∈ {m∗,m′}.
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Let ΦH ⊆ H denote the event that τ−i is already determined at H, i.e.:
ΦH =
{
y ∈ H
∣∣∣ (∀z, z′ ∈ Z(y))(τ−i(z) = τ−i(z′))} (4)
and let Φ¯H = H\ΦH be its complement. Notice that the probability of ΦH and the distribution
of τ−1−i (a−i) conditional on Φ
H , are independent from i’s choice at H. Hence, by Bayes’ rule:
E
[
ui(a
′
i, a−i)
∣∣H,m′ ] = ζ∗ (ΦH ∣∣H,m′)E[ui(a′i, a−i) ∣∣H,m′,ΦH ]
+ ζ∗
(
Φ¯H
∣∣H,m′)E[ui(a′i, a−i) ∣∣H,m′, Φ¯H ]
= ζ∗
(
ΦH
∣∣H,m∗)E[ui(a′i, a−i) ∣∣H,m∗ ]
+ ζ∗
(
Φ¯H
∣∣H,m∗)E[ui(a′i, a−i) ∣∣H,m′, Φ¯H ]
≥ ζ∗
(
ΦH
∣∣H,m∗)E[ui(a′i, a−i) ∣∣H,m∗ ]+ ζ∗ (Φ¯H ∣∣H,m∗)wi(a′i)
Together with (3), this yields the following inequality which does not depend on m′:
E
[
ui(a
∗
i , a−i)
∣∣H,m∗ ] ≥ ζ∗ (ΦH ∣∣H,m∗)E[ui(a′i, a−i) ∣∣H,m∗ ]+ ζ∗ (Φ¯H ∣∣H,m∗)wi(a′i)
The last inequality holds for for each point in the game where i chooses a∗i with positive
probability. Integrating over them yields:
∑
a−i∈A−i
ζ∗(a∗i , a−i)ui(a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
[
ζ∗(−i, a∗i , a−i)ui(a
′
i, a−i) + ζ
∗(i, a∗i , a−i)wi(a
′
i)
]
Which correspond to the alternative characterization if ICE from equation (2). Since i, a∗i
and a′i were arbitrary, it follows that α is an ICE. 
B.2. C-rationalizability and FC-rationalizability
Proof of Proposition 5. C-rationalizable actions are clearly not absolutely dominated. For
the opposite direction, fix an action a∗i ∈ Ai that is not absolutely dominated in A
′. Let
a∗−i ∈ argmaxa−i∈A−i ui(a
∗
i , a−i). Since a
∗
i is not dominated in A
′, for every a′i ∈ Ai there
exists some a−i(a
′
i) ∈ A
′
−i such that ui(a
∗) ≥ ui
(
a′i, a−i(a
′
i)
)
. Hence a∗i is a best response to
λi ∈ Λi(A
′), with λi(a
∗
−i|a
∗
i ) = 1 and λi
(
a−i(a
′
i)
)
= 1 for a′i 6= a
∗
i .
An elimination procedure can be described by a function K : A → A , describing kept
actions, such that for A′ ∈ A : (i) never adds new actions, i.e. K(A′) ⊆ A′; (ii) never eliminates
undominated actions, i.e. CR(A′) ⊆ K(A′); and (iii) if there are dominated actions then it
always eliminates at least one, i.e. CR(A′) 6= A′ implies K(A′) 6= A′.
Now consider the corresponding sequence of surviving actions (An) ∈ A N defined recur-
sively by A1 = A and An+1 = K(An). For n ∈ N with An 6= ∅, there exists some action profile
a0 ∈ An. Ans, since the game is finite, for each player i there exists a best response a∗i to a
0
−i.
By (ii) this implies that a∗ ∈ CR(An) ⊆ An+1. Thus, by induction, (An) is weakly decreasing
sequence of nonempty sets. Therefore, since A is finite, (An) converges in finite iterations to
a nonempty limit A∗. Since ACR ⊆ CR(ACR) and CR( · ) is ⊆-monotone, (ii) implies that
ACR ⊆ An for all n ∈ N, and thus ACR ⊆ A∗. Finally, (iii) implies that A∗ ⊆ CR(A∗) and
thus A∗ ⊆ ACR. 
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Proof of Proposition 10. a∗i ∈ FCRi(A
′) if and only if it is a best response to some λi =
µλ0i + (1−µ)λ
1
i , with λ
0
i ∈ ∆(A−i\A
′
−i), λ
1
i ∈ Λ(A
′
−i) and µ ∈ [0, 1]. Which holds if and only
if it is a best response to those beliefs which are more favorable for a∗i , i.e. beliefs with:
λ1i
(
argmax
a−i∈A−i
{
ui(a
∗
i , a−i)
} ∣∣∣ a∗i
)
= 1 and λ1i
(
argmin
a−i∈A−i
{
ui(ai, a−i)
} ∣∣∣ai 6= a∗i
)
= 1
Hence, after some simple algebra, a∗i ∈ FCRi(A
′) if and only if for every a′i ∈ Ai:
(1− µ)
[
w¯i(a
∗
i )− wi(a
′
i)
]
+
∑
a−i 6∈A′
−i
µλ0i (a−i)
[
ui(a
∗
i , a−i)− ui(a
′
i, a−i)
]
≥ 0
where w¯i(a
∗
i , A
′) ≡ maxa−i∈A′−i
{
ui(a
∗
i , a−i)
}
That is, if and only if it is a best response to
some (non-counterfactual) belief in the auxiliary strategic form game (I, A˜, u˜) with A˜i = Ai,
A˜−i =
(
A−i\A−i
)
∪ {a0−i}, and u˜i : A˜→ R given by:
u˜i(ai, a−i) =


ui(ai, a−i) if a−i 6∈ A
′
−i
w¯i(a
∗
i , A
′) if a−i ∈ A
′
−i ∧ ai = a
∗
i
wi(a
′
i, A
′) if a−i ∈ A
′
−i ∧ ai 6= a
∗
i
The result then follows from the well known equivalence between never best responses and
dominated actions, cf. Lemma 3 in Pearce (1984). 
B.3. Sequential implementation
Proof of Proposition 2. By definition A2 ⊆ A1 = A. Now suppose that An+1 ⊆ An for
some n ∈ N. Since ICE( · ) is a monotone correspondence, then so is T( · ). Hence, An+2 =
T(An+1) ⊆ T(An) = An+1. Therefore, by induction, An+1 ⊆ An for all n ∈ N. Since A is
finite, this implies that (An) converges after finite iterations to a limit A∞.
It follows that there exists some m ∈ N such that A∞ = Am = T(Am), and thus A∞ =
T(A∞). Furthermore, since ICE() ⊆ ICE(Am) contains the set if correlated equilibria, it
follows that Am = T(Am) ⊇ T(∅) 6= ∅. Finally, let A′ ∈ A be such that A′ ⊆ T(A′). By
definition A′ ⊆ A = A1. By monotonicity of T, if A′ ⊆ An then A′ ⊆ T(A′) ⊆ T(An) = An+1.
Hence, by the induction principle, A′ ⊆ An for all n ∈ N, which implies that A′ ⊆ A∞. 
Proof of Theorem 3. A∞ = T(A∞) by Proposition 2. A∞ ⊆ T(A∞) implies that supp(α) ⊆
A∞ ⊆ A∞∪AR for α ∈ ICE(A∞∪AR). Hence, ICE(A∞∪AR) is characterized by a finite set
of affine inequalities, and is thus convex. A∞ ⊇ T(A∞) then implies that there exists some
α∗ ∈ ICE(A∞ ∪AR) such that α∗i (ai) > 0 for every i and ai ∈ A
∞
i .
Let G∗ be the mediated game which implements α∗ as an ICE with respect to A∞ ∪AR,
and consider an action a0i ∈ A
∞ ∪ AR used as a threat. If a0i ∈ A
∞, then the unique
information set in which i is asked to choose a0i is along the equilibrium path. If a
0
i ∈ A
R
i \A
∞
i
then, by definition, a0i is a best response to a (non-counterfactual) belief λ ∈ ∆(A−i). Every
information set in which i is asked to use a0i is off the equilibrium path, and thus i may believe
that the most likely tremble leading to it corresponds to −i choosing according to λ. In either
case, choosing a0i is indeed sequentially rational. Following recommendations thus constitutes
a sequential equilibrium.
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Now consider any α ∈ ICE(A∞ ∪ AR) and the corresponding mediated game G. Let
Gˆ be the extensive form mechanism in which (i) the mediator randomizes between G and
G∗ with probabilities (1 − ε) and ε respectively; and (ii) players are only informed about
recommendations, in particular they cannot distinguish between V or V ∗. Now suppose
players agree that trembles in G∗ are more likely than trembles in G, so that whenever they
are asked to perform an action in A∞ ∪ AR, they will believe that they are either along the
equilibrium path, or in G∗. From the previous analysis it follows that complying remains
to be sequentially optimal. And hence the distribution αˆ = (1 − ε)α + εα∗ is sequentially
implementable. Of course αˆ approximates α as ε approaches 0. If one allows for ε = 0
(meaning that the mediator can make mistakes), then α is sequentially implementable. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let Ai = {ai, bi} for i = 1, 2, and suppose that there are no repeated
payoffs. If some player i has an absolutely dominated strategy, say ai, and let a−i be −i’s
unique best response to ai. In this case (ai, a−i) is the unique ICE with respect to A
CR, and
it is a sequential equilibrium of the simultaneous move game. In every other case, I will show
that every action can be played with positive probability in a sequentially implementable dis-
tribution (i.e. AS = A), and hence the result follows from Theorem 3. This is straightforward
if there are no strictly dominated strategies, because then there exists a completely mixed
(sequential) equilibrium.
The interesting cases are when there are no absolutely dominated strategies, but at least
one player has a strictly dominated strategy. Let λi, λ
′
i ∈ Λi denote the counterfactual beliefs:
λi(a−i|ai) = 1 ∧ λi(b−i|b−i) = 1 and λ
′
i(b−i|ai) = 1 ∧ λ
′
i(a−i|b−i) = 1 (5)
If bi is not absolutely dominated but it is strictly dominated by ai, then it must be a best
response to either λi or λ
′
i. Furthermore, since there are no repeated payoffs, it must be a
strict best response. There are two cases to consider depending on whether one or two players
have dominated strategies.
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Figure 6 Implementation of b1 when it is the only dominated action.
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Fist suppose that player 2 has no dominated strategies but b1 is dominated by a1. Further
assume (without loss of generality) that a2 is a best response to a1. This implies that b2 is the
unique best response to b1, and that (a1, a2) is a strict NE of the simultaneous move game.
If b1 is a best response to λ1, then it suffices to have player 1 move first and make his choice
public. By backward induction, in the unique SPNE, player 2 will choose a2 if he chooses
a1 and b2 if he chooses b1. Hence, 1’s counterfactual beliefs are λ1 and b1 is the unique best
response.
Otherwise, if a′1 is a best response to λ
′
1, then it can be implemented as an equilibrium
of the mechanism in Figure (6), with ε > 0 small enough. The equilibrium strategies are
represented with arrows. Player’s are willing to choose ai because (a1, a2) is a strict Nash
equilibrium. Player 2 is willing to choose b2 because it is a best response to b1. Player 1 is
willing to choose b1 because his conjectures at that moment are close enough to λ
′
1. Since all
the information sets are on the equilibrium path, the equilibrium is sequential.
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Figure 7 Implementation of b1 when b2 is also dominated.
Finally, suppose that both players have strictly dominated strategies, say b1 and b2. In
this case (a1, a2) is a strict NE. If bi is a best response to λi, then it can be implemented as a
NE of the mechanism where i moves first and −i chooses b−i along the equilibrium path and
punishes deviations with a−i. Otherwise, if bi is a best response to λ
′
i, then it can be played
with positive probability in a NE of the mechanism depicted in figure 7, with ε > 0 small
enough. Hence there always exists EFMs G1 and G2 with NE in which b1 and b2 are played
with positive probability.
The proof is not complete because the equilibria are not subgame perfect. For that
purpose, one can construct a third mechanism in which nature randomizes between G1 and
G2 and the simultaneous move game, and every action is played with positive probability
along the equilibrium path. Information sets can be connected so that, whenever a player is
supposed to choose bi he believes that he is in G
i. Doing so guarantees that the equilibrium
is sequential. 
B.4. QS implementation
The proof of theorem theorem 7 is divided in two parts regarding necessity and sufficiency.
To establish necessity it suffices to show that given a QSE of an EFM, every action played with
positive probability (on or off the equilibrium path) is in AFCR. Then the proof of Theorem
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1 applies simply replacing wi(a
′
i, A) with wi(ai, A
FCR). This fact is established in Lemma 11.
Given an EFM and an QSE (σ∗, ψ∗), let A∗i ⊆ Ai denote the set of actions that i plays with
positive probability is some information set, i.e.:
A∗i =
{
ai ∈ Ai
∣∣∣ (∃H ∈ H )(∃si ∈ Si)(σ∗i (si) > 0 ∧ si(H) ∈Mai(H)}
Lemma 11 Every quasi-sequential equilibrium σ∗ of an extensive form mechanism satisfies
A∗ ⊆ AFCR.
Proof. Fix some a∗i ∈ A
∗
i chosen with positive probability in some H ∈ Hi, and a move m
a∗
i ∈
Ma
∗
i (H) that represents a∗i and is chosen with positive probability. For each other action
a′i 6= a
∗
i , pick a move m
a′
i ∈ Mai(H) representing a′i at H. Now let µ = ψ
∗
i
(
ΦH
∣∣H) ∈ [0, 1],
where ΦH is the event that τ−i is already determined at H, as defined in (4). Finally, let
λ0i ∈ ∆(A−i) and λ
1
i ∈ Λi(A
∗) be the given by:
λ0i (a−i) = ζ
∗
i
(
τ−1−i (a−i)
∣∣H,ΦH) ∧ λ1i (a−i|ai) = ζ∗i (τ−1−i (a−i) ∣∣H,mai , Φ¯H)
and let λi = µλ
0
i + (1− µ)λ
1
i .
Sequential rationality together with the fact that ζ∗i
(
ΦH
∣∣H,m) and ζ∗i (τ−1−i (a−i)|H,m,ΦH)
are independent from m, imply that for every deviation a′i:∑
a−i∈A−i
λi(a−i | a
∗
i )ui(a
∗
i , a−i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
ζ∗i
(
τ−1−i (a−i) |H,m
a∗
i
)
ui(a
∗
i , a−i)
≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
ζ∗i
(
τ−1−i (a−i) |H,m
a′
i
)
ui(a
′
i, a−i)
=
∑
a−i∈A−i
λi(a−i | a
′
i)ui(a
′
i, a−i)
Hence a∗i is a best response to λ
∗
i ∈ Λi(A
∗), and thus a∗i ∈ FCR(A
∗). This holds for all i and
a∗i ∈ A
∗
i . Hence, A
∗ ⊆ FCR(A∗) and thus A∗ ⊆ AFCR. 
The sufficiency proof is constructive, and the mechanics behind the construction are as
follows. Every action a0i ∈ A
FCR
i can be rationalized by some beliefs about future choices in
AFCR−i and about arbitrary equilibrium or arbitrary past choices. Off path beliefs are assigned
in such a way that, whenever i is asked to choose a0i , he naively believes that doing so is in
his best interest. Since weak consistency does not imply any consistency requirements across
players, this can always be done even if it implies that i must be certain that his opponent is
or will be mistaken.
Proof of sufficiency for Theorem 7. Fix an equilibrium α ∈ ICE(AFCR). I will construct an
extensive form mechanism (G, τ) and a QSE (σ∗, ψ) implementing it. As an intermediate
step, let G0 denote the mediated game which implements α as an ICE with respect to AFCR.
I will add additional off-path histories to guarantee that the equilibrium becomes QS. Since
equilibrium path remains unchaged, it is sufficient to ensure that sequential rationality off the
equilibrium path, and that the off-path beliefs are weakly consistent.
In the construction, all the players’ information sets are pivotal and have a unique pivotal
move representing each action, and all the moves in each pivotal information set are pivotal, i.e.
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M(H) = ∪ai∈AiM
ai(H) and #M(H) = #Ai for H ∈ Hi. Furthermore, the only information
that a player has at the moment of making his choice is the action that he is supposed to
choose. Hence, it is possible to specify equilibrium strategies by labelling each information
set with the distribution of actions that the corresponding player is supposed to follow. For
instance Hai represents a pivotal information set in which, according to σ∗, i chooses the only
move which represents ai in H
ai .
Fix a player i and some action a0i ∈ A
FCR
i \ supp(αi). Since A
FCR is self-FC-rationalizable,
a0i is a best response to some counterfactual belief λi = (1 − µ)λ
0
i + µλ
3
i , with µ ∈ [0, 1],
λ0i ∈ ∆(A−i) and λ
3
i ∈ Λi(A
FCR). (1 − µ)λ0i can be further decomposed as (1 − µ)λ
0
i =
γλ1i + ηλ
2
i with γ, η ∈ [0, 1], λ
1
i ∈ ∆(A−i\A
FCR
−i ) and λ
2
i ∈ ∆(A
FCR
−i ). Assume without loss
of generality that λ3i (a¯−i|a
0
i ) = 1 and λ
3
i (a−i(a
′
i)|a
′
i) = 1 for every a
′
i 6= a
0
i , where a¯−i ∈
argmaxa−i∈AFCR−i
{ui(a
0
i , a−i)} and a−i(a−i) ∈ argmina−i∈AFCR−i
{ui(a
′
i, a−i)}.
The entire mechanism starts from an initial node where Nature chooses between G0 and
other additional paths. For each action a0i ∈ FCR
∞
i \ supp(αi), G
a0
i denotes a set of paths
on which player i is willing to choose ai and believe that the future choices of his opponents
will be restricted to FCR∞−i. The set of paths G
a0
i is depicted in Figure 8. The nodes are
labelled with circled numbers, and the player moving at each node can be inferred from the
subindexes of the information sets.
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Figure 8 Incentives for a0i ∈ A
FCR
i \A
∗
i
The numbers within brackets, specify the sequence of mixed strategies that converges to
the equilibrium assessment. (εn) denotes an arbitrary sequence of sufficiently small positive
numbers converging to 0, and Ni = #A
FCR
i is the number of FC-rationalizable actions.
The sequence is not strictly mixed, but reach all the relevant information sets with positive
probability.10 The limit of this sequence generates weakly consistent beliefs. Hence, it only
10One could use a strictly mixed sequences by assigning probabilities or order ε3
n
or less to other
strategies, but this would only complicate the exposition unnecessarily.
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remains to verify the incentive constraints:
◦ At nodes (1) and (2), player −i is willing to make choices according to λ2i because he
believes that he is on the equilibrium path.
◦ At nodes (7) and (8), a¯−i and a−i may not be best responses to a
0
i or a
′
i. However,
they are in FCR∞−i and thus −i is willing to play them either along the equilibrium
path, or on Ga¯−i and Ga−i . Since −i will consider the deviations to and in Ga
0
i to be
unlikely (of order at most ε3), the incentives for these actions are independent from
what happens in this figure.
◦ First suppose that the information sets for i are fully contained in the figure:
− At (3) player i is supposed to choose an action which is a best response to λ2i .
And therefore his choice is trivially incentive compatible.
− It is straightforward to see that equilibrium beliefs for player i would generate
a conjecture λi at nodes (4)–(6), and thus he would be willing to choose a
0
i .
◦ Now suppose that either Ha
0
i or Ha
BR
i appear in other parts of the game. There are
only two possibilities:
− They could appear as punishments in the position analogous to (7) or (8) in
some Ga
0
−i . From i’s perspective, this has probability of order ε3 or lower, and
hence it is irrelevant for i.
− They could appear in the equilibrium path, or in some Ga
0
−i in the positions of
(3) - (8). In such cases, it will also be a best response to the conditional beliefs
and thus to the average beliefs.

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